The British economy [September 1988] by Ashcroft, Brian et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Ashcroft, Brian and Love, Jim and Battu, Harminder and Boyle, Stephen 
and Draper, Paul and Dunlop, Stewart and Grehan, Janet and Harrigan, 
Frank and Heeley, John and Lockyer, Cliff and Monaghan, Claire and 
McGregor, Peter and McNicoll, Iain and Perman, Roger and Stevens, Jim 
(1988) The British economy [September 1988]. Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, 14 (1). pp. 6-14. ISSN 2046-5378 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/53080/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The British Economy 
OVERVIEW 
Earlier prognostications of a slow-down in the 
rate of growth of output in the British economy 
have been confounded by recent evidence. 
Continuing high levels of output growth are a 
reflection of rapid growth in domestic - and 
particularly consumer - demand. But domestic 
demand is growing at a much faster rate than 
output and there are indications that the 
differential increased during the second quarter 
and middle of the year. The inevitable result 
has been a marked deterioration in the balance of 
payments. The government's use of interest rate 
policy as the sole instrument regulating the 
expansion of domestic demand leaves much to be 
desired. 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
The average measure of GDP at current market 
prices, nominal or 'money' GDP, rose by 1.3% 
between the final quarter of 1987 and the first 
quarter of 1988 to a level 9.5% higher than in the 
first quarter of 1987. After allowance for 
inflation, the average measure of GDP at constant 
market prices, 'real' GDP, rose by 0.6% between 
the two consecutive quarters to a level 4.2% 
higher than in the first quarter of 1987. The 
output based measure of GDP, which is 
conventionally regarded as the most reliable 
indicator of short-term change, recorded an 
increase of 0.7% during the first quarter of 1988 
to reach a level 5.2% higher than a year 
previously. Both the average measure of 'real' 
GDP and the output based measure therefore 
recorded a lower rate of growth in the first 
quarter of 1988 than the quarterly rate averaged 
during 1987. However, preliminary estimates 
suggest that output rose by 1.3% in the second 
quarter of the year - an annual rate of 5.3%. 
Although the level of output was 5.1% higher than 
a year previously, and therefore little different 
from the annual change to the first quarter, the 
most recent data cast some doubt on the view that 
growth in the economy is quickly reducing to more 
sustainable levels. The behaviour of the CSO's 
coincident cyclical indicator would appear to 
reinforce the doubts. This indicator, which 
attempts to show current turning points in the 
business cycle around the long-term trend and 
contains retail sales, production output and CBI 
survey information, as well as GOP data, among its 
component series, fell slightly during January and 
February of this year but resumed an upward path 
from March. 
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Real consumers' expenditure rose by nearly 1.5% 
between the fourth quarter of 1987 and the first 
quarter of 1988. This can be compared with a 
rate of change of 1% between the final two 
quarters of 1987. In the year to the first 
quarter of 1988 expenditure had risen by 7%. In 
this latest quarter, expenditure on most 
categories of goods and services increased, 
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although spending on clothing proved to be an 
exception. Within the consumer durables category, 
expenditure on vehicles grew by 11.5%, on 
furniture and floor coverings by 9.5% and on other 
durables by nearly 12%. There is therefore little 
evidence from these data of any moderation in the 
upward trend of consumer spending. The Department 
of trade and Industry's (DTI) retail sales volume 
index rose, in seasonally adjusted terms, by 2.4% 
in July, suggesting that, if anything, spending 
was accelerating. In the three months to July, 
the index was 1.5% higher than in the preceding 
three months and sales were 7% higher than in the 
same period a year earlier. Sales in the 
household goods category were particularly strong, 
with volumes 4% higher than the preceding three 
months. The CBI/FT distributive trades survey for 
August also provided little comfort for those 
wishing to see a downturn in the rate of growth of 
consumer demand. In the retail sector, a balance 
of plus 59% reported an increase in sales compared 
with the same month in 1987. This balance was the 
highest since January and comes after strong 
positive balances in May, June and July. 
Moreover, a balance of plus 70% expected sales 
volumes in September to be greater than in 
September last year. It therefore seems clear 
that the 4.5% point rise in interest rates since 
May has yet to affect consumer demand. 
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The underlying determinants of the growth of 
consumer demand continue to be buoyant. The rate 
of growth of average earnings was 8.5% in June, 
having remained at this level since December last 
year. Provisional estimates for July indicate 
that the annual rate has now risen to 9%. Real 
personal disposable income (RPDI) has also 
increased at a brisk rate. Between the fourth 
quarter of 1987 and the first quarter of 1988 RPDI 
rose by 2.5%, to sand at a level 5.5% higher than 
the first quarter of 1987. However, the saving 
ratio is estimated to have risen to around 5.5% 
from the historically low level of 4.5% recorded 
in the fourth quarter of 1987. The rise reflected 
the slower growth in consumer expenditure compared 
to RPDI. In July consumer credit rose again by 
£300 million to stand at a record £25.4 billion. 
General government consumption fell by nearly 1.2% 
during the first quarter of 1988. As a result 
real government spending stood at 0.6% above the 
level attained in the first quarter of 1987. 
Gross fixed investment increased by 3.5% during 
the first quarter of 1988, rising to a level 10.8% 
above that attained in the same quarter of 1987. 
The growth in investment in the year to the first 
quarter 1988 is accounted for largely by spending 
in the private sector which rose by 14.5%. 
Investment by public corporations fell by 11% 
while general government investment spending rose 
by just 1.7%. By type of asset, investment in 
dwellings displayed the greatest increase in the 
year to the first quarter, rising by 22.2%, 
reflecting private sector expenditures which 
increased at a rate of 28.7%. Investment in 
Vehicles, ships and aircraft. Plant and machinery, 
and Other new building and works, rose by 11.4%, 
9.4% and 5.6%, respectively, during the same 
period. The June DTI survey of investment 
intentions forecast an increase of 16% in 
manufacturing investment during 1988. Investment 
in the other key sectors of the economy: 
construction, distribution and services, is 
forecast to rise at the lower, but still 
significantly positive, rate of 10%. 
The trade accounts continue to deteriorate and are 
symptomatic of the concern about the growth of 
demand pressure in the economy. The visible 
trade balance recorded a deficit of £4.0bn in the 
first quarter of 1988 which represented a further 
deterioration from the £3bn recorded in the 
preceding quarter. Provisional figures for the 
second quarter indicate a further significant 
deficit of £4.4bn. The non-oil trade deficit rose 
again to £4.9bn in the first quarter from the £4.1 
bn recorded in the previous quarter. Both export 
and import volumes fell in the first quarter of 
the year but at 5.5% the fall in exports was 
markedly greater than the 2.2% fall in import 
volumes. The oil surplus fell back to £0.9bn 
after the £0.1bn increase recorded in the 
fourth quarter of 1987. The deterioration in the 
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oil surplus can be clearly seen by comparing the 
surplus recorded in the first quarter of 1986 with 
the current figure. In that quarter the surplus 
stood at £1.9bn, around a billion more than the 
current figure. The current account moved 
further into deficit in the first quarter of this 
year, rising to £2.9bn. Further revisions to the 
trade accounts have now produced an estimated 
deficit on this account for 1987 of £2.5bn, 
compared with the previous estimate of a £1.6bn 
deficit. And the estimate for 1986 has now been 
revised downwards from a £0.1bn surplus to a 
£0.2bn deficit. Provisional estimates for the 
second quarter of 1988 suggest that the deficit 
was again £2.9bn, so that up to June the deficit 
was averaging almost a billion a month. However, 
in July the deficit deteriorated further to an 
estimated £2.2bn. 
In the second quarter of 1988, the output of the 
production industries is provisionally estimated 
to have increased by 1.5% compared with the 
previous quarter. This reverses the estimated 
decline of 1% recorded in that quarter and 
suggests that growth may not be moderating to the 
degree expected in the last quarter's Commentary. 
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By June output was 4.5% higher than in the second 
quarter of 1987. Manufacturing output also rose 
by 1.5% in the most recent quarter to a level 7% 
higher than a year earlier. By market sector, the 
output of the consumer goods industries rose by 
1%, compared with the 0.5% increase recorded 
between the preceding two quarters. Increased 
investment demand also appears to have had a 
favourable impact on the output of the investment 
goods industries where output rose by 4% between 
the latest two quarters. This stands in marked 
contrast to the 3% fall experienced in the 
previous quarter. 
In the second quarter there was the usual 
variation in the output performance of individual 
sectors. The output of the energy sector 
continues to fluctuate (see June Commentary). The 
change in this quarter was favourable, with output 
rising by 0.5% to a level 1% below that of a year 
earlier. Within manufacturing, the principal 
increase recorded was in metals, and engineering 
and allied, where output rose by 4% between the 
latest two quarters. In chemicals, food, drink 
and tobacco, and other manufacturing, output 
remained largely unchanged. The output of other 
minerals and the textiles and clothing industries 
fell by 2% and 1%, respectively. In construction, 
output was 10% higher than in the first quarter of 
1987. Overall, output in the production and 
construction industries rose by 1% in the first 
quarter of 1988 to a level 4.5% higher than in the 
first quarter of 1987. 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
In July, the Department of Employment introduced a 
new employment series workforce in employment. 
This replaces the employed labour force series in 
future monthly press releases on the state of the 
UK labour market. The 'employed labour force' 
constitutes the sum of employees in employment, 
the self-employed and HM Forces. The 'workforce 
in employment' includes the employed labour force 
plus participants in "work related government 
training programmes". This latter group consists 
of "those participants in programmes and schemes 
who in the course of their participation receive 
training in the context of a workplace but are not 
employees, self-employed or HM Forces". This 
revised presentation is in line with International 
Labour OrganisationIL0) guidelines. Estimates 
of the workforce in employment have been provided 
back to 1983 when YTS was first introduced. 
The workforce in employment is estimated to have 
risen by 119,000 in the first quarter of 1988. 
In the year to March 1988 the series is estimated 
to have risen by 618,000 and to have increased by 
2,140,000 in the five years since March 1983. The 
comparable figures for the employed labour force 
are 141,000, 529,000 and 1,806,000, respectively. 
Employees in employment rose by 111,000 in the 
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first quarter of 1988 and the composition of the 
change broadly corresponded to the established 
pattern. The number of employees in the service 
sector rose by an estimated 113,000 compared with 
revised estimates of 130,000 and 74,000 in the 
preceding two quarters. Manufacturing employment 
actually rose by an estimated 1,000, following 
reductions of 6,000 and 22,000 in the previous two 
quarters and another small increase of 3,000 in 
the second quarter of 1987. In other sectors, the 
energy and water supply sector continued to lose 
jobs with a 15,000 fall recorded, compared with 
reductions of 8,000 and 3,000 in the preceding two 
quarters. The other industries category, on the 
other hand, increased its employment by 13,000 
after a drop of 3,000 in the preceding quarter. 
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Productivity - output per head - growth continues 
to be high. In the first quarter of 1988 output 
per head in the whole economy was 3% higher than a 
year earlier. In manufacturing, the high rates of 
productivity growth experienced from the second 
half of 1986 have continued into 1988. In the 
first two quarters of the year the percentage 
increases on a year earlier were 7.6% and 7.2% 
respectively. The underlying increase in average 
weekly earnings in the year to June was 
provisionally estimated to have been 8.5%. This 
rate has continued since the 0.25% point increase 
in the rate which first occurred in the year to 
last December. However, provisional estimates for 
July suggest that the rate has now risen 9%. The 
growth in unit labour costs reflects the relative 
growth of earnings and productivity. In the whole 
economy, the percentage increase on a year earlier 
rose to 5.9% in the first quarter of 1988, 
compared with increases of 4.8% and 4.2% in the 
preceding two quarters. In manufacturing, the 
faster growth of productivity has resulted in the 
growth of wages and salaries per unit of output 
remaining relatively low in recent quarters. In 
the first quarter of 1988 the percentage increase 
on a year earlier stood at 0.5% and this was 
followed by a 1.4% increase in the second quarter. 
With increasing pressures for higher wages, unit 
labour costs have tended to edge up during the 
first six months of this year despite the good 
productivity performance in manufacturing. 
Seasonally adjusted unemployment continues to fall 
with some evidence of a slight slackening in the 
rate of decline. In the six months ending July, 
the reduction is provisionally estimated to have 
averaged 41,800 per month. In the preceding six 
months the average change over six months has 
averaged 40,300 in June, 39,400 in May, 43,400, in 
April, 44,700 in March, 48,800 in February and 
51,400 in January. By July, seasonally adjusted 
unemployment stood at 2.314 million, or 8.2% of 
the workforce, down 58,500 on the previous month. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Relations between the EEPTU and the trade movement 
figured prominently in British industrial 
relations. From the early part of the year it 
had been clear that the expulsion of the EEPTU 
would take place at the Trades Union Congress in 
September. 
These events prompt three questions: first, were 
there particular developments and changes which 
made the expulsion almost inevitable? Secondly, 
will the EEPTU be successful outside the TUC? 
Thirdly, what are the implications and 
consequences for the trade union movement. 
Increased tensions between trade unions have been 
a feature in recent years, due largely to the 
continuing decline in trade union members. Trade 
union membership is down a further 1.3% over the 
past year and now represents 9,126,911 employees, 
or 41.5% of the labour force. Many of the inter 
union disputes as well as differences over 
policies arise from the increased competition 
between union for members. This competition is 
further exacerbated by technological changes 
blurring the traditional demarcational lines 
between trade unions, and by the emergence of 
differing policies, such as single union and no 
strike arrangements with employers. 
The TUC's proposals, to tackle the twin issues of 
union relationships and the decline in union 
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membership, were published before the expulsion of 
the EEPTU. These suggested: first, a new code 
of practice on inter union relations. Secondly, 
unions would be required to notify TUC of planned 
single union deals for TUC scrutiny before 
signing. Thirdly, unions would not be permitted 
to conclude no strike deals. Fourthly, there 
were to be new measures designed at enhancing 
contacts with employers' organisations on 
industrial relations issues. Fifthly, there 
would be a pilot scheme for providing labour 
market intelligence and union membership. 
Finally, the TUC should adopt a new role in co-
ordinating union services, eg financial and 
legal, and the promotion of trade unionism 
especially amongst women and young people. 
However, pressures to maintain membership levels 
exerts considerable pressures on trade unions to 
pursue individual, rather than collective, 
interests and hence to conclude single union deals 
and agreements which breach traditional 
recruitment boundaries. Whilst the EEPTU has 
some twenty single union agreements both the TGWU 
and AEU have been criticised over issues of union 
poaching and single union deals. The TGWU plans 
to widen its recruitment base by a series of 
measures including mergers, improving services for 
members and, interestingly, by improving links 
with employers, especially those on greenfield 
sites. 
It is unlikely that either the traditional union 
machinery for dealing with inter union membership 
disputes, the Bridlington principles, or new 
policies will be able to cope with these pressures 
coupled with new employer demands as to patterns 
of recognition. New methods - possibly along the 
American practice of agency arrangements - will be 
necessary. Union agency arrangements allow for 
an employee to be a member of a particular union, 
but to be represented, for bargaining purposes, by 
another union. An agency fee is paid to the 
union which represents the employee to the 
employer. American practice allows for periodic 
elections to establish whether employees wish to 
change their bargaining union. 
Whether the EEPTU will be successful is more 
difficult to assess. Undoubtedly, the union will 
face a number of inter union disputes some of 
which it has generated. There is the possibility 
of conflict with ACTT over recruitment in the 
satellite broadcasting industry. The EEPTU has 
won negotiating rights in the Docklands light 
Railway and may use this as a springboard to win 
recognition rights with the operators of the 
Channel Tunnel. The union has been involved in 
merger discussions with the AEU. If this were to 
be successful the resultant union would represent 
more than a tenth of all unionists. One 
development has been EEPTU moves to use COMPS (the 
Council of Managerial and Professional Staffs) as 
a base for extending its white collar membership. 
The success of such developments would make the 
EEPTU the core of an alternative TUC, this would 
be much more attractive to those unions, 
including: UCATT, IPCS, PAT and RCN, with whom 
the EEPTU has sought discussions. A key factor 
will be the number of electricians and electronics 
workers in ten years time. The Henley Centre 
predicts a rise to some 700,000. Such an 
expansion, coupled with employer support, might 
herald a reasonably secure future for the union. 
There are implications and consequences of this 
split in the union movement. First, it 
highlights a divide as to the directions for 
future trade union policy. Eric Hammond, 
the EEPTU general secretary, described his 
union's policy as 'competitive business unionism'. 
Such policies have been long held in the United 
States and imply a much reduced political 
commitment, a greater competition for members, and 
a focusing of union power on the economic 
objectives of their members, rather than the 
social aspirations which have long been a feature 
of British trade unionism. As such it represents 
a philosophy more in tune with Thatcherism than 
that held by the majority of the movement. 
'Evidence' to support the relevancy of such a 
philosophy can be drawn from the results of a 
recent MORI survey of trade union members. This 
found that a greater proportion supported the 
actions of the EEPTU than the TUC. Some 58% 
favoured single union deals, but 60% were against 
a widespread adoption of 'business unionism' as 
key to success in the future. 
Business unionism weakens the rank and file 
vitality of a trade union movement and tends to 
lead to greater central control and less democracy 
within the union. It stresses the very cosy 
relationships and arrangements between employers 
and trade unions which Norman Fowler, the 
employment secretary, has argued should end. He 
has called on employers to establish individual 
relationships with their employees, arguing that 
the revolution in the labour market is that 'the 
individual will want to negotiate his own terms 
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and conditions of employment including his own 
pension arrangement. He will want to reflect his 
own skills, efforts and capacities, not the 
outcome of some distant negotiations between 
employers and trade unions. But business 
unionism can stress relationships between the 
union and employer which do not reflect the 
members' i nterests'. 
Others who see the Electricians as the vanguard of 
the new trade union realism have based their 
arguments on a reworking of the What do unions do? 
arguments of Freeman and Medoff (Basic Books, New 
York, 1984). However, as Professor Metcalf 
noted, in his well publicised article comparing 
productivity rates in unionised and non-unionised 
firms, there are major problems in assessing the 
economic impact of unions, let alone the value of 
their social functions. More significantly he 
argues that both the vanguard and the traditional 
philosophies will face difficulties in maintaining 
union membership levels. 
A review of the central organisations of 
tradeunion movement in other countries gives some 
indications as to the likely implications for the 
British movement of a continued split between 
unions. Sweden has separate central 
organisations for white collar and manual 
employees. In Germany the three central 
organisations represent the interests of manual, 
civil service and salaried employees. Both have 
well organised and powerful union movements, 
Sweden with 94% of employees in union membership 
and Germany with 42%. The divisions between the 
central organisations are logical. By contrast 
France has evolved a union movement with five 
overlapping and competing confederations, divided 
on political and religious lines, a fragmented and 
weak movement. Trade Unions in Japan are 
similarly divided. The structure of enterprise, 
or company unions, leads to both a large number of 
trade unions, more than 74,000 in the 1980s and to 
very weak confederations. Both Sohyo and Domei 
have few powers over individual unions. A 
division in the movement along blurred and 
indistinct lines, where unions compete for 
members, is likely to lead to a further weakening 
of the movement, a weakening liable to be 
exploited by some employers. Such a pattern could 
lead British trade unions to resemble their French 
counterparts with considerable implications for 
the pattern of industrial relations. 
Such considerations tended to obscure the other 
issues at the TUC, most notably the decision 
concerning the government training plans. Popular 
concern did not focus on the motion in support of 
the restoration of union recognition at GCHQ nor 
on NUM's loss of its seat on the General Council 
as its membership had fallen below 100,000. 
The future pattern of industrial relations within 
the education sector remains unclear. Unions 
representing secondary teachers have considered 
binding pendulum arbitration - where the 
arbitrator can only decide for one side or the 
other, there is no scope for compromise - in 
return for the government restoring negotiating 
rights. However, the government appears to seek a 
negotiating body on which it constitutes the 
majority on the employers side, and in which 
arbitration can only be used when both sides 
agree. Other features of the emerging system can 
be gleaned from developments in CTCs. The city 
colleges plan no strike clauses in agreements, 
performance related pay schemes and either no 
union or recognition of PAT. Birmingham CTC, for 
example, has indicated a preparedness to pay 5% 
above normal rates with performance related pay. 
In the Health Service the issues of pay and 
funding of the costs of pay increases surfaced. 
The costs of the pay and regarding award were 
known to be high and problematic. In May the 
government had sent guidelines to health 
authorities indicating that for grading purposes 
only those nursing sisters with a continuing 
responsibility for running a ward should be put 
into the higher grade (Grade G). This meant that 
only one sister per ward would be graded in Grade 
G, the others would be located in Grade F and as 
such would receive an increase of only some £20 
per year. Such a guideline would appear to have 
ignored the need to run wards continuously for 24 
hours per day and seven days per week. Where 
work is continuous few, if any, enterprises pay 
those responsible for work on shifts less than 
their day time counterparts - yet this appears to 
be government policy. If this is not an inept 
policy it poses questions as to why the government 
would wish to engender low morale amongst nursing 
staff. 
Elsewhere in the public sector the move towards 
greater flexibility and a weakening of traditional 
bargaining arrangements continues. Within the 
coal industry, British Coal has been extending 
flexibility and six day working. The agreement 
with the UDM involves miners working six days a 
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week for three weeks followed by one week off. 
This agreement will enable coal production to be 
increased from 233 days per year to 300. The 
agreement includes a clause which states that the 
union signing a local agreement for six day 
working will be recognised, for collective 
bargaining purposes, for at least ten years. As 
such the deal will aid UDM both in its attempts to 
recruit at new mines and to lessen NUM efforts at 
encroaching on the UDM. 
Management has also re-introduced an old payment 
method - fix price contracts - under which teams 
of miners bid for fixed price contracts to 
complete particular jobs, such as clearing a coal 
face. 
Recent moves to improve flexibility in British 
Rail have focused on introducing a flexible 
trainman grade. This combines the existing jobs 
of assistant driver and guard. It will reduce 
some of the barriers between the NUR and ASLEF as 
it provides for guards under the age of 46 to 
train as drivers (thereby overcoming the shortage 
of drivers). It introduces new grades of 
conductor and senior conductor. British Rail has 
extended performance and merit pay to middle 
management levels. Pay for middle managers is 
now firmly linked to performance. Travellers 
Fare white collar staff have performance related 
pay schemes based on an annual review of a series 
of management objectives. 
The industrial action in the Post Office stemmed 
from the introduction of pay supplements for new 
recruits. The difficult recruitment area 
supplements were introduced in an attempt to 
overcome turnover rates of over 50% in some South 
East areas. However, the difficulty in securing 
a return to work added credence to other causes; 
most notably the consequences of devolving 
negotiations to lower management levels. A 
further cause appeared to be pressures to improve 
productivity which have led to accusations of 
'hardline' management and undoubtedly a lowering 
of morale. This may well lead to further 
industrial action before the end of the year. 
Flexibility was also a major theme in LACSAB's 
review of its operations. In recognising the 
need for more flexibility in negotiating practices 
and levels LACSAB pointed out that the current 
cost per authority for negotiations was £4717. It 
speculated as to whether if national bargaining 
were substantially reduced in scope, each 
authority could conduct its own negotiations for 
less than £5,000. It noted the recommendations 
of the Employers' Strategy Document which called 
for more flexibility for authorities, less 
national prescription and fewer smaller 
negotiating bodies. LACSAB's role will focus 
more on advice for individual authorities and less 
on bargaining. 
Elsewhere, similar moves to downgrade the 
importance of national bargaining were announced. 
The Water Boards proposed to end all national 
deals as from 1989. The Broadcasting industry 
has reduced the number of items negotiated at 
national level and has increased the scope for 
local variations. 
In the private sector the move towards 
derecognition of unions continues to grow at a 
slow pace and in relatively few industries. The 
Pontins Holiday group has withdrawn union 
recognition. Sky television has decided not to 
recognise trade unions. Over the past four years 
some 40 companies have withdrawn trade union 
recognition. 
In recent months calls have again been made to 
abolish wages councils. Few employers seem to 
fear the implications of national bargaining 
accelerating pay rates from bottom to top without 
taking account of firms' needs to structure pay 
according to performance and profitability. More 
likely, since it would seem to be large firms that 
have led the call, the aim is to secure the 
freedom to relate pay to local labour markets. A 
number of MPs have argued that Wages Council 
agreements are cosy arrangements for employer and 
unions which are bad for the consumer. Such 
arguments appear to neglect the reasons for the 
Wages Council legislation, namely the need to 
protect the employee from exploitation. 
One of the consequences of the introduction of 
local pay in the Civil Service has been a growth 
in the variation pay supplements in the South 
East. In the Inland Revenue recruitment grade 
staff aged 18 or over, with one year's service 
will get £600 in south east districts outside 
London. Executive officers in two London offices 
with recruitment problems will also get £600. 
Foreign office administrative assistants get £600 
on joining; admin officers get £300 on joining and 
£600 in their second year; secretarial grades get 
£400. The Department of Energy pay assistants 
and officers based on seniority £200 after 2 
12 
years, £400 after three years and £600 after four 
years. In the Department of the Environment only 
personal secretaries in central London receive 
payments. In the Customs & Excise Department 
most payment is aimed at executive and higher 
executive officers in VAT offices in London, but 
Higher Executive Officers in Reading and 
Northampton Collection Centres receive £400 and 
£500 respectively. As yet it is uncertain as to 
whether such competition between government 
departments is being exploited by staff in short 
supply. 
PROGNOSIS 
Earlier prognostications of a slow-down in the 
rate of growth of output in the British economy 
have been confounded by recent evidence. 
Continuing high levels of output growth are a 
reflection of rapid growth in domestic - and 
particularly consumer - demand. But domestic 
demand is growing at a much faster rate than 
output. Between the first quarters of 1987 and 
1988 total domestic expenditure grew by 6.8% 
whereas 'real' GDP grew by 4.2%. And there are 
indications that the growth of domestic demand 
rose again relative to output growth during the 
second quarter and middle of the year. The 
inevitable result has been a marked deterioration 
in the balance of payments, with the current 
account recording an unprecedented £2.2bn deficit 
in July. 
There appears to be a consensus that demand in the 
British economy is growing too rapidly. Despite 
the buoyancy of demand in the other major OECD 
countries (see World Economy section) which has 
had a favourable impact on British export growth, 
the growth in British demand - by July car imports 
were growing at an annual rate of 30%, other 
consumer goods by 14% and intermediate goods by 
27% - largely accounts for the recent marked 
deterioration in the trade position. However, 
the deficit need not pose much of a problem, in 
the short run, if it continues to be financed 
without the need for a significant - and sudden -
depreciation of the exchange rate. That could 
have serious inflationary implications. The 
British Government's sizeable gold and foreign 
currency reserves, currently standing at around 
$50bn, provide considerable scope for manoeuvre. 
But to retain investor confidence in sterling, 
either the deficit must be viewed as self 
correcting and/or policy must be seen to be 
tackling the causes of the deficit and 
contributing to the adjustment. The current 
upsurge in investment is partly responsible 
for the deterioration in the trade accounts 
following significant imports of capital 
goods, which were increasing at an annual rate of 
25% by July. However, it appears unlikely that 
the growth in capacity, and reduction in capital 
goods imports, will lead to a switch in domestic 
demand of sufficient size to markedly reduce the 
trade deficit. That will only be achieved if 
their is a reduction in the rate of growth of 
domestic demand. 
The progressive increase in base rates from 7.5% 
in May to 12.5% in August provides a clear signal 
of the government's desire to moderate the growth 
in domestic demand. But as we commented in the 
June Commentary, relying on interest rates alone 
is an unsatisfactory approach to managing the 
economy. Higher interest rates will, other things 
being equal, raise the exchange rate and tend to 
worsen the deficit. On the other hand, higher 
rates should brake any tendency for sterling to 
fall too quickly because of the deficit, and this 
could minimise the effect of depreciation on 
inflationary expectations. Higher interest rates 
could also produce an unsatisfactory balance of 
demand in the economy if firms' investment plans 
were more interest sensitive than the spending 
decisions of consumers. Moreover, to the extent 
that higher interest rates do affect domestic 
spending - and the econometric evidence suggests 
that investment in dwellings, consumer durables 
and inventories are particularly responsive -
there is the question of the time lag before the 
higher rates have their desired effect. Current 
building society practices of reviewing interest 
rates charged to certain borrowers only once a 
year - currently around 45% of borrowers - imply 
that lags may be becoming more extended. Faced 
with this uncertainty and the possible adverse 
effects on the current account deficit, the 
Chancellor would have been better advised to have 
applied other instruments to moderate the growth 
in demand. That would have reduced the need for 
such a large increase in interest rates. The 
most frequently canvassed alternative, credit 
controls, would under present market conditions, 
not have the effect its proponents expect and 
could introduce severe distortions affecting both 
equity and efficiency. Financial de-regulation 
and the abolition of exchange control severely 
limits the degree to which the supply of credit 
can be restricted to private institutions and 
individuals. Those who avoid the control may be 
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the least socially deserving. And economic 
efficiency would suffer if projects denied access 
to credit promise a higher rate of return than 
those obtaining credit through avoidance of the 
control. 
We have argued in previous Commentaries that the 
appropriate policy response to achieve both 
external and internal objectives is to use 
interest rates to target the exchange rate and tax 
adjustments to moderate the domestic pressure of 
demand. The Chancellor would have been better 
served if the direct tax cuts introduced in the 
last Budget had been at least partially reversed. 
A step in this direction in the autumn would be 
welcome. In our view it remains the only hope 
for lower interest rates by the turn of the year. 
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